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Abstract. Computer controlled systems consist of a complex interaction between technical proc-
ess, human task and software. For the development of safety critical systems new method are re-
quired, which not only consider one of these parts of a computer-controlled system. In this paper a
qualitative modeling method is presented. The method is called SQMA, Situationbased Qualita-
tive Modeling and Analysis and it origin goes back to Qualitative Reasoning. First, all parts of a
system are modeled separated and then combined to a unique model of a computer-controlled
system. With this qualitative model a computer supported hazard analysis can be realised.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In recent time, it is recognized that, especially for the
safety analysis of computer-controlled systems, new
common methods are required. Nowadays software
makes it possible to control more complex proc-
esses, but at the same time it is responsible for the
welfare of humans and environment. Failures in a
software program can influence the technical proc-
ess with unforeseeable effects. On the other hand, a
defect in technical components may influence the
regular behavior of a control program. Furthermore
human tasks effect the normal flow of the process
either in a direct way or in an indirect way by the
control program.
Many catastrophes show clearly that accidents do
not only rely on an single failure but also on a com-
bination of failures (multiple failures). Evaluating
the consequences of multiple failures conventionally
is hard or almost impossible. Many exiting methods
for safety analysis are only a manual for a systematic
proceeding. The analysis is performed in an expert’s
mind (brainstorming) and solely relies on expert
judgement, experience and knowledge. Frequently
the complex interaction between the system compo-
nents overextend an expert to judge whether a sys-
tem is safe or not. Not rarely complex interrelations
between system components lead the experts to the
limits of their abilities.
Within new approaches a computer-aided safety
analysis can be realized. The combinatorial thinking
is more convenient and is done faster by a computer
program, similarly to a chess program. An obliga-
tory prerequisite for the implementation of a computer-
aided safety analysis is a description of the controlled
system, which is interpretable by the computer. But
even this prerequisite represents the heaviest burden.
Nowadays there is still no suitable modeling method,
which is able to describe  the behavior of the technical
process, the automation software and all the possibili-
ties of the human task simultaneously [ 1,2 ]. One of
the big problems that exists is the complexity of such
systems. In general it is almost impossible to describe
the whole system and the relations of their components
with formulas. Furthermore and especially for safety
analysis, it is not important to model each detail of the
system.
To build such models using qualitative modeling is a
new approach. But what is qualitative modeling?
To demonstrate the idea of qualitative modeling we
consider a little example (Fig. 1). A human understands
the function of the represented system in qualitative
way. We know the substantial functions of the compo-
nents and therefore we can suggest on the possible
behavior of the total system. Some events of the system
are not important for the behavior. The bullet (E) may
hit the balloon or not, the speed and size of the bullet is
not necessary for this problem. Some events of the
system are not important for the behavior. The bullet
(E) may hit the balloon or not, the speed and size of the
bullet is not necessary for this problem. We can reduce
the interrelation between bullet and balloon to a simple
statement: if the bullet hits the balloon, then the balloon
explodes (and the brick falls down). If the bullet misses
the balloon, nothing will happen. Exactly this abstracted
knowledge about the behavior of the system is trans-
mitted to the computer by a qualitative model.
Fig. 1. Example of a complex system1
In the scope of this paper the method of SQMA
(Situationbased Qualitative Modeling and Analysis)
is presented. In the first part the principles of SQMA
are demonstrated and in the second part an example
serves to show its typical application.
2 SQMA
SQMA is a component-oriented modeling method.
First, all components of a system are qualitatively
described independent of their function later in the
system. The structure of the system represents the
rules of the interactions between the components.
Within this assumptions a model of the whole com-
puter controlled system can be calculated by the
computer.
2.1 Modeling Components
SQMA uses a two step technique to model a com-
ponent of the system:
1. Black box – modeling
2. White box – modeling
In the first step, all possible terminals of a compo-
nent and their quantities are described by qualitative
interval variables. For example the pistol in Figure 1
has two terminals, one for the trigger and the other
for the muzzle. The terminal “trigger” has a quantity,
which determines the necessary pressure to trigger a
shot (e.g. more than 5mbar). With interval variables
we only have to consider some important values for
the pistol’s variables. The Quantity “trigger” has the
ranges [0, 5mbar]; [5mbar, 3 bar); (3 bar, ¥). The
fist interval stands for "not enough pressure", the
second for "enough pressure"; and the third for "to
much pressure". The quantity of the terminal muzzle
has the intervals [0,0] which means "no shot" and
[1,¥] stands for "shot".
To make the model easier to read we can add com-
ments to certain intervals like we did above. With
the specifications of the terminals and the quantities
the computer creates a complete situation space of a
component. Situations mean a certain combination
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of the interval of the quantities. Based on the declara-
tions above, for the pistol there are 3 x 2 = 6 situations
possible, Table 2 shows a situation table of the compo-
nent “pistol”.
Table 1. A situation table of the model “pistol”.
No. Trigger Muzzle
1 Not enough pressure no shot
2 enough pressure no shot
3 to much pressure no shot
4 not enough pressure shot
5 enough pressure shot
6 to much pressure shot
But not all of these combinations are realistic for the
behavior of a normal pistol. If the trigger is pulled to
soft, the pistol won’t shoot. Therefore a secondary step
of modeling is necessary to describe the real behavior
of the component: the white box – modeling.
The relation of input and output quantities is specified
by so called situation rules. For the pistol we can for-
mulate the constrain:
if not enough pressure then pistol won’t shoot
or with a simple formula:
Trigger < 5mbar -> shot = 0
All the situations that don’t fulfill this rule are deleted
from the situation table (e.g. situation No 2 in Table 2).
After considering all rules only situations are left which
describe the real behavior of a component. Using com-
ment rules heuristic knowledge is merged to the model
of the component. Certain groups of situations are
indicated regarding their function or they can be classi-
fied regarding their importance for safety. Let’s con-
sider the pistol again. What happens if the trigger is
pulled to hard. Will it break? Will the pistol shoot
anyway? Perhaps the pistol will shoot anyway, then the
comment rules is:
Trigger > 3bar => Pistol_shoots, Pistol_is_damaged D
All situation with the valve of quantity “trigger” is
higher than 3 bar will receive the comment “Pis-
tol_shoots, Pistol_is_damaged, and they are classified
with the letter “D” (like ”damaged”).
After we consider the static behavior of the component,
we are going to consider the dynamic behavior. Possi-
ble transition between the situations depend on many
criteria. For example physical quantities rely on certain
regularities such as steadiness or differential dependen-
cies. Similar to the situation rules, we use transition
rules to specify such regularities.
After having modeled each component, we have to
describe the connection between them.
2.2 Modeling the Connection between Compo-
nents
Now, we have to think about the interrelation be-
tween the components. Therefore a block-oriented
view of the system is used. A “net list” describes the
structure of the system: Fig. 2 show the example of
the component pistol and the component balloon.
The net list is:
pistol ballon
muzzle
covering
trigger
node 1:{pistol.muzzle;
         balon.covering}
Fig. 2: Building a netlist
Now a program transform the structure of the sys-
tem into a system of equations interpretable by  the
computer. The kind of equations depend on the part
of the system we are considering. The interrelation
of technical components depend on physical regu-
larities, but interrelations between software compo-
nents depend on special rules of special communi-
cation (e.g. bus protocols).
2.3 Analysis of the System
Finally an algorithm combine all situations of the
components model. The algorithm considers ques-
tions like the following: Is it possible that, compo-
nent “A” can be in situation “n” and at the same time
component “B” is in situation “m”. For each combi-
nation, the quantities of a component have to be
checked with the system equations. If the result of
all system equations for a special combination of
situations (system situation) is true, then this system
situation can happen in reality. Then an even more
important question must be answered. Does the
system contain dangerous system situations? –
When modeling the component we classified differ-
ent kinds of situations with an attribute. With these
attributes a computer can quickly separate the sys-
tem situations into dangerous, not-intended or
regular. Now an analyst doesn’t need to think about
possible combinations. He only considers the result
of the computer analysis. The analyst has to interpret
the result himself by considering the likelihood of
these system situations and whether prevention is
necessary or not.
3 THE EXAMPLE SYSTEM
“HOMOGENIZING PLANT”
3.1 The System
Fig. 3 shows a technical system, in which a ho-
mogenizing process is to be run. An inlet valve
supplies a liquid into a tank with an integrated mixer.
The liquid is to be homogenized and to be removed
afterwards by the drain valve. The tank has a door,
which is to be locked during the process cycle.
instructions
operations
manipulated
 variable
process
information
information
control program
operator
tank
M
–3
inlet valve
drain valve
Fig. 3. A computer-controlled system: homogenizing
plant
The system was automated with a open loop structure,
therefore a operator has control functions like
· starting, terminating and interrupting the process
· modifying the value for the level of the tank (de-
sired value specification)
The function of the controller consists of the follow-
ing:
· receiving the requests of the operator, checking
them and thereupon executing the suitable mes-
sages
· The controller must prevent safety critical states of
the technical process.
The function of the controller was implemented by a
small software program in C++ .
Now, with the help of the technique of SQMA this
system is modeled. It will demonstrate how complex
the interaction between technical process, automation
software and human control interventions turned out
even for such a small system. First, all parts of the
homogenizing plant are regarded individually and are
modeled. Subsequently, the three resulting models are
joined to the unique model of the automation system
“homogenized plant”. With the analysis of the unique
model, predicates about the behavior and about the
security of the system can be made.
3.2 Qualitative Modeling of the Technical Proc-
ess
The process is a typical continuous flow process.
The technical system consists of two identically
constructed electromagnetic valves and a tank with
an integrated mixer. The technical system is usually
described with PI2- and process flow diagrams,
which serve as a base for the qualitative modeling of
the technical process. In the following, the valve
serves as an example for modeling a technical com-
ponent.
As described in chapter 2.1, the valve is firstly re-
garded as a black box. The quantities at the terminals
are described qualitatively (Figure 4). On the termi-
nals “IN” and “OUT” there appear flow quantities,
which consist of the flow strength (IIN , IOUT ) and of
an appropriate pressure (PIN, POUT ). The terminal C
has a manipulated variable “S” (signal), which modi-
fies the status of the valve. These quantities are
described with qualitative interval variables. With
different intervals of these quantities, we can deter-
mine whether the flow is from left to right, vice
versa or if there is no flow through the valve.
I
IN
P
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IN CONTROL
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OUT
POUT
IOUT
Fig. 4. Black-box view of a valve
In order to model the behavior of the valve, we need
to find the appropriate situation rules. The rules for
the functioning of a valve are:
· If the manipulated correcting variable “S” is set
(S =1, valve opened), then the pressure between
the Terminals IN and OUT is equal to zero
· If the correcting variable “S” is not set (S=0,
valve closed), then no flow takes place through
the valve
Theoretically with respect to the model specification
with SQMA, 18 different situations are possible
after the black-box step. Only 6 situations fulfill all
the situation rules. The remaining situations de-
scribe the behavior of the valve. Also, an expert can
bring in his knowledge. For example, all situations
at which the manipulated variable “S” is set (S =1)
and no flow through the valve is possible, receive
the comment “defect” and the attribute N (not in-
tended).
The component mixer tank is modeled in a similar
way. The composition of the three models inlet
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valve, tank and drain valve take place with the help of a
program automatically. Situations of the different mod-
els are combined among themselves and are checked for
their validity with the system equations, as mentioned
in chapter 2. As results we receive a situation table,
which contains all possible system situations (alto-
gether 50) of the technical process.
3.3 Qualitative Modeling of the Controller Soft-
ware
For this system the controller software was developed
with the method ROOM. ROOM stands for Real Time
Oriented Modeling and supports the development proc-
ess of software projects [8]. With ROOM functions of
the software are divided into components, the so-called
actors. These actors can only communicate among
themselves by messages on defined channels. Messages
have a signal part and optionally a data part. For further
information about ROOM, the book “Real-time Ob-
ject-Oriented Modeling” is recommended [8].
The behavior of the actors is described with so-called
ROOM-Charts. They are extended state machines, based
on Harel’s Statecharts. A transition is triggered by a
certain event (signal). Optionally, further conditions for
a transition can be specified, e.g. the data part of a mes-
sages can be checked for certain values.
Further detail of the design of the controller software is
of no importance. To translate a ROOM-design into a
qualitative model the signal and data part of a messages
must be expressed by using interval variables. The val-
ues of the qualitative variables stand for the different
contents of a messages. During the black box modeling,
the complete situation space is regarded. The situations
describe all the possible combinations of the messages
from an actor. In contrast to the modeling of the techni-
cal process, there is no physical law for the behavior of
the software which can be consulted for the formula-
tion of the situation rules. With ROOM the behavior of
the actors were specified by state-transition diagrams,
which permit only predetermined combinations of the
messages. A state-transition diagram can be expressed
with the help of interval arithmetic, if the following
points are observed:
· the trigger condition for a transition, i.e. the event
which caused the state
· the modification (actions), which are caused by a
state
· the history of the preceding states.
The white-box modeling step consists of the transfor-
mation of the state-transition diagram into situation
rules. After considering these situation rules, only the
situations which describe the behavior of the actor
remains. Similarly to the modeling of technical compo-
nents, groups of situations can be commentated and
classified. We can interpret these group of situations as
scenarios for the suitable states of the ROOM-Chart.
The design of the system model orients itself on the
ROOM structure model. Due to the determined
message channels, only certain messages can be
exchanged between the actors and their environment.
Similarly to the technical process, this fact is de-
scribed with system equations. Subsequently, the
calculation of the qualitative software model takes
place with the help of a program. 50 of 4096 possi-
ble situations are suitable for the qualitative de-
scription of the controller software.
3.4  Qualitative Modeling of Human Task
In the presented example an operator has different
possibilities to intervene into the process: He can
open the door of the tank; start, terminate and abort
the process and set new values for the filling level.
Additionally he receives information from the soft-
ware about the process status.
How do we model human behavior with SQMA?
We consider the human as black box and we are only
interested on his possibilities to intervene with the
system. His access into the system is also repre-
sented as terminals of the component “human”. The
quantities of the terminals are described with inter-
val variables, too. For example the qualitative vari-
able for the new filling level contains all possible
values from negative to positive infinitely. This
means that humans can set any value. Actions of a
humans can easily be expressed in a qualitative way
(e.g. open the tank door, shut it, or do nothing).
In contrast to the modeling of the other part of the
system, a black box modeling of the human is suffi-
cient. This involves the modeling of unreasonable
control interventions and logical intervention at the
same time. For the safety analysis we suppose that a
human can be e.g. in panic and don’t act in the cor-
rect way. For the example “homogenizing plant” the
qualitative model “operator” has 64 situations of
different control interventions.
3.5 The Analysis of the System “homogenizing
plant”
For the analysis, the models have to be joined together.
To couple the model of the technical process and the
software, additionally, the necessary actuators and
sensors can be modeled in the qualitative way. Software
information is converted into physical dimensions, or
vice versa. A qualitative modeling of the field periph-
eries additionally enable the possibility of analyzing the
system behavior with defective actuators or sensors.
Combinatorial 224000 situations are to be expected for
the whole system. The specified system structure re-
duced the number of possible situations to 49. In the
following situation table (Table 2), we can see an ex-
tract of the result. The first row contains the compo-
nents of a special system part. For example the com-
puter has calculated, that a situations can happen in
which the inlet valve is closed, the tank is empty and the
drain valve is closed. An adequate state of the control-
ler software is that the actor plant controller is initial-
ized and the actor plant dialog manager is ready, be-
cause human has started the system. By evaluating the
attributes the computer declares this situations as in-
tended.
As mentioned in chapter 2 the analysis is computer
aided. A program sorts the system situations into in-
tended (normal), not-intended and dangerous opera-
tions.
Table 2: An extract from the situation table of the
homogenizing plant.
We can compare the system situations with a snap-
shot of the controlled system. In our example we
have 36 situations, which are scenarios for the nor-
mal operation mode of the homogenizing plant. But
for the safety analysis the other kind of situations are
more interesting. With the help of the qualitative
model the computer has detected 6 dangerous situa-
tions of the system. These situations describe the
following scenario:
Liquid flows out through the door of the tank.
With the developed software it can occur that liquid
flows out from the open door of the tank. Depend-
ing upon the type and amount of the liquid the con-
sequences can be differently serious. Nevertheless
these system situations should never occur during
the normal operation mode. Here, the qualitative
model helps us to detect a design error of the con-
troller software. These dangerous situations can
occur only if the actor “plant controller“ is in the
state “initialization”. If an analyst considers these
situations, he will soon notice the causes for this
failure: the process conditions at the beginning of
the process is not checked by the software during its
initialization.  If e.g. in a preceded operation of the
system the process was aborted by a user, liquid can
still be in the tank. When renewed starting the sys-
tem the door is unlocked again and the users has the
possibility to open it (like 6 situations clearly show)
or not.
Therefore the developers of the software are forced
to change the software design. The state transition
diagram of the actor “plant controller” is not suffi-
ciently specified. A possible solution is to extend the
state transition diagram by a state “checking process
status”. This new state has the function to lock the
door first and only change into the state “initializa-
tion” if the tank does not contain any liquid. In the
other case, it notice the user immediately and change
into the state “draining”.
When the discussed modifications of the software
design are made, we can model the new design with
SQMA once more and integrate it into the whole
model for the system. After the renewed analysis of
the model, the situations we discussed above
shouldn’t exist. But if so there must be new failures
in the design and we have to think about it again.
4 Summary and Outlook
The presented example shows, how computer aided
safety analyses can be realized with the help of the
qualitative modeling method SQMA. The intended
operation modes can be checked under any condi-
tions, moreover the computer does announce not-
intended and dangerous situations of the system to
the user. This helps the analyst to judge the system
safety. The result is reproducible at any time.
Thereby, the quality of the safety analysis can rise
noticeably.
The example demonstrates clearly how complex the
interaction between the system parts can turn out, even
for this small example. For larger systems it is almost
impossible to discover or analyze several failures at the
same time by conventional brainstorming.
Like other modeling techniques the quality of the result
falls and rises with the underlying model. The compo-
nent-oriented view of SQMA creates outstanding pre-
requisites for support by an existing and checked
model-component library. Similarly to conventional
CAD-Systems, models can be created on a graphic level
comfortably.
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